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 Law, Religion & Violence: The Importance of Islamic Law as a Tool for Refuting 
the Ideology of Violent Extremists 
 
 
      Ben Clarke1 
 
 
  ANZSIL- ISIL Conference Delhi 5-6 December 2009 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Violent attacks by radical Islamists against civilians represents a serious and continuing threat to human 
security in a number of States, including India and to a lesser extent Australia.  Causes of such violence 
have been extensively debated in the literature of a variety of disciplines including law, psychology and 
political science.2  This paper examines one aspect of this debate: the use by extremists of concepts 
derived from Islamic law to justify violence against civilians.  It does so by identifying religious norms 
that underpin the ideology of radical Islamists who engage in terrorism.  The thesis advanced here is 
that an effective response to such violence requires, among other things, that the ideology propagated 
by radical Islamists be challenged.  To do so, their approach to interpretation and application of Islamic 
law must be refuted.  It is argued that Muslim States and the schools of Islamic jurisprudence must  
energetically engage in this task if the ideology that motivates such attacks is to be thoroughly 
discredited.  Until this occurs, it will be difficult to counter the process of radicalisation of young 
Muslims who, through exposure to the ideology of radical Islamist organisations such as al-Qaeda and 
Jamaa Islamia ('JI'), often regard violence against civilians as permitted by their religion.   
                                                 
1 PhD (Melbourne), LLM (Bristol), LLB (Tasmania).  Associate Professor, University of Notre Dame Australia.  Member 
of the Centre for Muslim States and Societies (University of Western Australia). Ben is a member of the Centre for 
Muslim States and Societies (University of Western Australia) and the Research Unit for the Study of Society, Law and 
Religion (University of Adelaide, Australia). Email: bclarke@nd.edu.au. 
2 For a discussion of the importance of inter-disciplinary analysis of the causes and cures of  terrorism see: SPECIFIC 
HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES: NEW PRIORITIES, IN PARTICULAR TERRORISM AND COUNTER-TERRORISM 
Terrorism and human rights Final report of the Special Rapporteur, Kalliopi K. Koufa E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/40 25 June 
2004, page 2. 
1. Introduction 
 
According to a range of radical Islamist groups who have deliberately engage in violence against 
civilians, their actions are justified under Islamic law.3  Such groups have often argued, by reference to 
the Koran and other sources of Islamic law, that extra-judicial violence against civilians is a permissible 
response to actual or perceived injustices against Muslims.4  Much of the literature on religious 
justifications for violence by Islamists centres around the notion of violent jihad.5  However other 
norms are referred to by radical Islamists to justify attacks on civilian and other targets.  This paper 
highlights one of them: the notion that Islamic law requires apostasy to be punished by death.  The 
nature of these beliefs is examined, together with the debate among Muslim scholars as to the scope of 
Islamic law on punishment of apostasy.  The importance of this debate for States that face ongoing 
threats of violence by radical Islamists is highlighted.  Proposals are then offered as to how the 
ideology of violent extremists may be refuted by reference to Islamic law and the role that States, 
international organisations and Islamic schools of jurisprudence may play in refuting the ideology of 
radical Islamists.  Before exploring these matters, the nature of the threat from violent Islamists to 
Australia and India is briefly noted.  Law and policy responses of States to such extremism are briefly 
noted.  It is argued that while these responses may be necessary, they may not be sufficient to counter 
the ideology that motivates radical Islamists to engage in violence.   A further matter raised here is 
whether the The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy ('Global Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy')6 needs to be revised to deal with this issue. 
 
 
                                                 
3 See Section 4 below. 
4 Ibid. 
5 See for example: Shaheen S. Ali, and Javaid Rehman, ‘The Concept of Jihad in Islamic International Law’ (2005) 10(3) 
Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 321-343; Hilmī  Zawā tī , Zawā tī ,tī ,, Is Jihā d a Just War?: War, Peace, and Human Rights d a Just War?: War, Peace, and Human Rights 
Under Islamic and Public (2001);  Abdallah Saeed, ‘Jihad and Violence: Changing Understandings of Jihad Among 
Muslims’[72], in Tony Coady & Michael O’Keefe, Terrorism and Justice: Moral Argument in a Threatened World 
(2002).  
6 The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy is annexed Plan of action (A/RES/60/288).  See 
http://www.un.org/terrorism/strategy-counter-terrorism.shtml  Accessed 19 September 2009. 
2. A Common Experience 
 
2.1 India 
 
Over the last decade, hundreds of Indian and Australian citizens have been killed and injured in various 
attacks carried out by radical Islamists.  India has suffered numerous attacks of this kind over a number 
of years.  Only two are mentioned here.  They include the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks which claimed 
166 lives.  This violence was  carried out by Pakistani nationals who were trained, equipped and 
financed by the radical Islamist group Lashkar-e-Taiba.7   On 20 July 2009, Mohammad Ajmal Kasab, 
the lone surviving gunman from the group of 10 attackers, expressed his wish to plead guilty to the 
charges against him.8  They included murder and waging war against India.9   The attacks were 
launched at luxury hotels, Mumbai’s main railway station, a restaurant and a Jewish center.10   The 
same organisation carried out the 2003 Mumbai bombings, which claimed 52 lives.  Three members of 
Lashkar-e-Taiba were sentenced to death in August 2009 for their involvement in these attacks, 
following their conviction on charges of murder, criminal conspiracy and terrorism.11  They have 
appealed their death sentences.12   
 
 
                                                 
7 See Zahid Hussain, "Islamabad Tells of Plot by Lashkar" The Wall Street Journal, 28 July 2009. Available at: 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124872197786784603.html?mod=googlenews_wsj. Accessed 28 July 2009.   'Lashkar-e-
Taiba responsible for Mumbai terroristic act' 28 November 2009     
http://www.hindu.com/2008/11/28/stories/2008112862080100.htm.; Mark Mazetti, (28 November 2008), "US 
Intelligence focuses on Pakistani Group", The New York Times, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/29/world/asia/29intel.html?partner=permalink&exprod=permalink Accessed 20 
September 2009. 
 . 
8 Sukanya Shetty , Mustafa Plumber, 'I confess... please end my trial, deliver your judgment' Indian Express 20 July 2009. 
Available at   http://www.indianexpress.com/news/kasab-confesses-to-role-in-26-11-terror-attacks/491739.  Accessed 19 
September 2009. 
9 For details of the charges see:  Hari Kumar, 'Pakistani charged in Mumbai assault' The New York Times (26 February 
2009).   http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/26/world/asia/26mumbai.html?_r=1  Accessed 19 September 2009. 
10  'Pakistani charged in Mumbai assault' The New York Times (26 February 2009) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/26/world/asia/26mumbai.html Accessed 19 September 2009; 'Kasab seeks translated 
copy of charges sheet' 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/2611_trial_Kasab_seeks_translated_copy_of_chargesheet/articleshow/4246845.
cms  Accessed 19 September 2009. 
11  "Death for three in 2003 Mumbai bomb blasts case". The Hindu. 7 August 2009.  
http://www.hindu.com/2009/08/07/stories/2009080757860100.htm at 13 October 2009. 
12 Phil Hazelwood, 'Death penalty for 2003 Mumbai bombers' 6 August 2009, Available at  
http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-world/death-penalty-for-2003-mumbai-bombers-20090806-ebex.html, Accessed 
13 September 2009. 
2.2 Australia 
 
Over a hundred Australians have lost their lives in violence commited by racial Islamists during the last 
decade.  All such attacks have occurred outside of Australia.  The most lethal attacks in terms of the 
loss of Australian lives occurred on 12 October 2002 at the Sari Club and Paddy’s Pub in Kuta Bali.  
These attacks were organized and conducted by members of JI.13  88 Australians were killed in these 
attacks which left a total of 202 people dead with a further 240 injured.14  On 9 November 2008, after 
exhausting all avenues of appeal, three persons convicted of carrying out the bombings (Imam 
Samudra, Amrozi Nurhasyim, and Ali Ghufron) were executed by firing squad.15  
 
A number of radical Islamist networks operating inside Australia have been disrupted in recent years 
before planned attacks were carried out.  In 2009, various members of Islamist cells were convicted and 
sentenced for planning violent attacks in Sydney and Melbourne.16   
 
 
3. A Common Response 
 
India and Australia have responded to violence against their citizens through rule of law based 
measures.  These include investigation of the crimes, prosecution of alleged perpetrators, expansion of 
criminal laws to ensure that peripheral actors involved in attacks of this kind may be brought to justice 
and the provision of extra-territorial jurisdiction to courts to grant them authority to deal with offshore 
crimes of this nature where necessary.17  At a policing level, there has been enhanced cooperation 
between the investigative branches in various States.  In the case of the Bali bombings, Australia 
provided forensic and other assistance to Indonesian authorities, who prosecuted a number of members 
of JI who were subsequently convicted of a number of crimes arising from their involvement in the 
                                                 
13   Gerard Chaliand, Arnaud Blin, The history of terrorism: from antiquity to al Qaeda (2007) 46-347. 
14  Subsequent attacks include the 9 September 2004 bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, and the 1 October 
2005 Bali bombings. 
15  Irwan Firdaus, "Indonesia executes Bali bombers" The Jakarta Post (9 November 2008).  
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/11/09/indonesia-executes-bali-bombers.html. Accessed 9 September 2009. 
16 Meraiah Foley, ' Australian terrorist sentenced to 15 years'  New York Times,  3  February 2009, Available at:     
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/03/world/asia/03iht-03terror.19886637.html Accessed 19 September 2009; 'Terrorism 
cell member jailed for 5 years'  ABC News (Australia) 2 September 2009,  Available at: 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/09/02/2674854.htm  Accessed 19 September 2009. 
17  For Australian terrorism offences passed after 11 September 2001, see:  Criminal Code 1995 (Cth), Schedule 1, Part 5.3 
(Terrorism) divisions 100-103. 
attacks.18  This cooperation has been reinforced by bilateral agreements,19 other forms of cooperation,20 
and implementation of certain measures outlined in Chapter VII resolutions of the UN Security Council 
21as well as the UN General Assembly's Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.22  What is absent from the 
these resolutions is any obligation upon States and international organisations to cooperate in refuting 
the ideology of radical Islam through interpretation of Islamic Law. 
 
 
4. Reliance on Religious Norms to Justify Violence against Civilians: The practise of al-Qaeda and 
affiliated organisations 
 
The issue of religious justifications offered for violence against civilians has gained international 
attention following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.23  The architects of these attacks, al-
Qaeda, have sought to justify acts leading to the loss of civilian lives on the basis of religious norms.24  
Such consequences are often excused by the organisation as necessary measures aimed at the expulsion 
of non-Muslim armies from Muslim lands or the overthrow of ‘apostate governments.’25   Such 
                                                 
18 See Note 14 below. 
19    See the bilateral Counter-Terrorism Memorandum of Understanding (2002) between Australia and Indonesia, 
extended for 3 years in 2008.  See Indonesia Country Brief (DFAT) 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/GEO/indonesia/indonesia_brief.html Accessed 19 September 2009. 
20 See The Agreement between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on the Framework for Security Cooperation 
(Lombok Treaty), signed by Foreign Ministers in Lombok, 13 November 2006.   
21   See for example: UN Security Council Resolution 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. 
S/Res/1373.  A comprehensive list of UN Security Council resolutions on terrorism is available at: 
http://www.un.org/terrorism/securitycouncil.shtml Accessed 8 July 2009. 
22 See above n 6  (Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy). See Indonesia Country Brief (Australian Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade).  Available at  http://www.dfat.gov.au/GEO/indonesia/indonesia_brief.html Accessed 19 September 
2009. 
23 See: Mark Juergensmeyer, 'From Bhindranwale to Bin Laden: The Rise of Religious Violence' (October 14, 
2004). Orfalea Center for Global & International Studies. Paper 20.  
http://repositories.cdlib.org/gis/20 ; Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious 
Violence (2004).  But see Robert A Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (2005).  See also: 
Shmuel Bar, 'The Religious Sources of Islamic Terrorism', Policy Review No. 125, June & July 2004   Available at 
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3438276.html   See also: Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Infidel: My Life (2007, Free 
Press), 169–92 . 
24 See: ‘Al Qaeda Fatwa: World Islamic Front against Jews and Crusaders’, published in al-Quds al-Arabi (London UK), 
23 February 1998, 3.  But see letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi dated 9 July 2005.  (al-Zawahiri 
deals with the issue of fighting Shi’ite (‘ apostates’) in some detail and encourages al-Zarqawi not to be distracted from 
the main target: US forces.) Available at  http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/report/2005/zawahiri-zarqawi-
letter_9jul2005.htm accessed 13 October 2009. 
25 See for example: 'Purported bin Laden tape urges Somalis to overthrow new president' 19 March 2009 CBC New
 http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2009/03/19/somalia-alqaeda-binladen.html Accessed 19 September 2009.   See also 
letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi dated 9 July 2005.  Available at 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/report/2005/zawahiri-zarqawi-letter_9jul2005.htm accessed 13 October 
2009. 
justifications are outlined in: speeches by prominent figures including Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-
Zawahiri and Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi; video messages left by suicide bombers prior to terrorist attacks 
in countries including the UK, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Israel; and video recordings made during the 
beheading of unarmed hostages (eg in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq).  During these various 
presentations, Islamic law (including verses of the Qur’an and Hadith) is often recited.  A classic 
example is an al-Qaeda videocassette, broadcast on al Jazeerah TV satellite network in December 
2004, in which Osama bin Laden reads a letter to "To the Muslims in Iraq in Particular and The 
[Islamic] Nation in General."  The speech directly invokes the doctrine of  apostasy.  It states: 
"Aiding America, or the Allawi government [in Iraq] which is apostate [Murtada], or the Karzai 
government [in Afghanistan], or the Mahmoud Abbas government [in the Palestinian Authority] 
which is apostate, or the other apostate governments in their war against the Muslims, is the 
greatest apostasy of  all, and amounts to abandonment of  the Muslim community.  
 Participation in the Iraqi or Palestinian Elections Is Apostasy 
"Muslims must beware of  these kinds of  elections. They must unite around the Jihad warriors and 
those who resist the occupiers." He continued, "Anyone who participates in these elections … has 
committed apostasy against Allah."26  
In similar fashion, Al-Zarqawi brands the Shi'ite apostates for their heretical beliefs in a letter 
purportedly written to senior al-Qaeda leaders.  The letter was seized by Coalition forces in a raid on a 
safe house in January 2004.27  The author is committed to ‘fighting the sects of apostasy.’  In exploiting 
the notion of apostasy to justify an ideology of hatred and violence,28 criminal organisations such AQI 
follow a long tradition of invoking Islamic jurisprudence on the punishment of kafir (heretical belief) to 
justify the killing of those with different political or religious views.  In modern times, this tradition can 
be traced back to Egyptian dissident Sayyid Qutb, who argued (from his gaol cell) that it was necessary 
to rid not only the Islamic world but also the entire planet, of the "structure" of Jahiliyya (godless 
                                                 
26    Relevant extracts from the letter are available at; 
<http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Area=sd&ID=SP83704&Page=archives> Accessed 13 October 2009. 
27  The letter is available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/transcripts/20040212_zarqawi_full.html   Accessed 13 October 2009.   
28 This phenomenon has been critiqued in a number of programme on Arab satellite channels.  Al Arabiya highlights the 
problem in Sinaat al-Mawt (Death Industry).  It is argued below that abolishing laws that required the punishment of 
apostasy is one way of undermining the death industry and the international harm it causes to respect for the Islamic 
principles invoked by extremists.  
ignorance).29 Qubt's writings inspired Ayman al-Zawahiri, a senior al-Qaeda figure and apologist for its 
ideology.30 Al-Zawahiri continues to promote an ideology that actively encourages criminal attacks on 
civilians, including Muslims, who are deemed ‘apostates.’  This far-reaching doctrine has been invoked 
to justify attacks upon non-Muslim States and also Muslim governments that are deemed apostate.31  
Osama bin Laden’s theological direction was heavily influenced by both Zawahiri and Abdullah Azzam 
(a Palestinian academic who masterminded a new ultra-extreme form of wahhabism).32 Azzam, who 
was killed by a massive explosion in Peshawar in 1989, was admired by bin Laden for both his 
scholarship and his mujahedeen credentials (gained from his involvement in the jihad against Soviet 
occupation of Afghanistan).  Azzam’s legacy is a popular ideology, keenly exploited by bin Laden, 
which justifies mass-killing in an attempt to overthrow ‘apostate’ regimes and eliminate those who 
support them.33 
 
At this juncture it is important to emphasize the contrast between the beliefs of violent extremists and 
those of the vast majority of Muslims.  Opinion polls suggest that most Muslims - while sympathetic to 
some of the goals of al-Qaeda - regard the killing of civilians as contrary to Islam.34  Nonetheless, 
reliance by violent extremists upon Islamic norms to justify their actions raises sensitive issues 
regarding the nature and scope of such norms and who has the authority to enforce them.35  The 
enforcement of penalties against apostates in a number of Muslim countries also leads to questions 
about the example  these States are setting for Non-State Actors (such as  al-Qaeda) who invoke the 
same doctrine (often together with the concept of jihad) to justify their criminal campaign of sectarian 
                                                 
29   See Abel Bari Atwan, The Secret History of al Qaeda (2006), 72-73. 
30  Gene W. Heck, When Worlds Collide: Exploring the Ideological and Political Foundations of the Clash of 
Civilisations (2007) 79. 
31  See Atwan, above n 29, 176-178.  
32  See Atwan, above n 29, 70.  See also: Monte Palmer & Princes Palmer, Islamic Extremism: Causes, Diversity & 
Challenges (2008) 147. 
33   See Atwan, above n 29, 43, 193; Palmer & Palmer, above n 32, 146-7.   On the ideological and para-military training of 
the Mumbai bomber , see Aryn Baker  and Jyoti Thottam, 'The Making of a Mumbai Terrorist'  Time Magazine 8 March 
2009 http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1883334-3,00.html  Accessed 20 September 2009.  See also 
"Mumbai Terrorist Wanted to Kill and Die and Become Famous, ABC News, 03-Dec-2008". 
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/Story?id=6385015&page=2. Accessed 20 September 2009. ("When we asked whether he 
knew any verses from the Quran that described jihad, Ajmal Amir said he did not," police said. "In fact he did not know 
much about Islam or its tenets," according to a police source.). 
34 Steven Kull, Clay Ramsay, Stephen Weber, Evan Lewis, Ebrahim Mohseni, 'Public Opinion in the Islamic World on 
Terrorism, al Qaeda, and US Policies', 25 February 2009, p23,  Available at : 
http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brmiddleeastnafricara/591.php Accessed 20 September 2009. 
35 See Ben Clarke, ‘Law, Religion and Violence: A Human Rights-Based Response to the Punishment of Apostasy by State 
and Non-State Actors’ (2009) 30(1) Adelaide Law Review (forthcoming). 
violence.  Moreover, this State practice is at odds with the obligations of States that are party to the 
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (1966)36 ('ICCPR') to guarantee and protect the right to freedom 
of religion and belief.  Violence against apostates (whether judicial or extra-judicial in character) 
cannot be reconciled with these ICCPR norms.37  Attention now turns to the debate among Muslim 
scholars regarding whether apostasy should be punished. 
 
5. Islam & Punishment of Apostasy: Two Very Different Schools of Thought 
 
The punishment of apostasy has been described as 'one of the most contentious issues in Islam.'38  
Whether 'earthly punishment' of apostasy is justified (or required) under Islam has been debate for 
centuries.  As noted in the preceding paragraph, the issue of penalty is of fundamental importance, in 
various countries, to the fate of those deemed ‘apostates’.  The debate about whether apostasy should 
be punished arises because while apostasy is condemned in a number of verses of the Qur’an, no 
earthly penalty for this sin is prescribed.39  As with all questions pertaining to Islamic law, analysis of 
whether the killing of apostates is permitted requires an examination of the various sources of Islamic 
law (fiqh).  Islamic law is discovered by referring to a hierarchal body of sources or foundations (usul).  
At the top of this hierarchy is the Koran, followed by sahih Hadith (authentic verses of the words of 
Muhammed).40  The selective use of analogical reasoning (qiyas) is another source, although it not 
universally accepted.  Consensus (ijmā') of the recognised body of religious experts is a further 
source.41   In order to ascertain whether such a consensus exists, reference may be had to interpretations 
                                                 
36 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Res 2200A (XX1), UN GAOR, 21st sess, supp no 16, UN Doc 
A/6316 (1966). 
37 See Section 6.1 below. 
38   See Shaikh Abdur Rahman, Punishment of Apostasy in Islam, (2007, Revised Edition) vii. 
39   See Qur’an 4: 90; Qur’an 5: 59; Qur’an 16: 108. 
40   Authoritative Hadith are those which are Sahih.  Sahih means 'of sound health'.  Hadith of this character are of the 
highest grade: their isnad (attestation) reflect the highest grades of transmission.  Sahih Hadith yields certainty of 
knowledge whereas Hadith that are weak (da'if) or even spurious (maudu) do not. See John Burton, An Introduction to the 
Hadith (1994) 200.  Farooq notes that: 'The vast and comprehensive body of Islamic laws (fiqh) critically rests on the 
Hadith literature. Islamic scholars, including the experts in Hadith, have gone to a great extent to defend the sanctity of 
Hadith literature and utilize it not just to expound Islamic knowledge, but also to formulate Islamic codes and laws 
pertaining to the entire gamut of life.' Mohammad Omar Farooq, 'Islamic Law and the Use and Abuse of Hadith' (2006) 
www.globalwebpost.com/farooqm/writings/islamic/law_Hadith.doc Accessed 3 July 2009.  Nonetheless, some Hadith 
identified as Sahih by eminent Muslim jurists are of doubtful accuracy.  See Muhammad Zubayr Siddiqi, Hadith Literature: 
Its Origin, Development & Special Features (1993) 57-58; M. M. Azami, Studies in Hadith Methodology and Literature 
(1977) 92.  Sahih (authentic) Hadith are usually mutawatir (derived from "continuously recurrent" or "a report by an 
indefinite number of people related in such a way to preclude the possibility of their agreement to perpetuate a lie." See 
Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (2003) 93. 
41  Jonathon Porter Berkey, The formation of Islam (2003) 145. 
of the Qur’an and Hadith reached by jurists over the ages (including modernists).  An exhaustive 
review of all sources of Islamic law of relevance to the issue of punishment of apostasy is beyond the 
word constraints of this article.  However, attention is paid to key verses of the Qur’an (the primary 
source of Islamic law) that deal with apostasy and those that emphasize freedom of religion and belief.  
Regard is also had to Hadith that form the cornerstone of the traditional approach to punishment of 
apostasy.  The opinions of a range of classical and modernist Muslim jurists and other commentators 
are also considered.  Conclusions are then drawn with respect to whether the killing of apostates is 
justified under Islamic law.    
 
5.1 The Traditional View 
 
Islam’s schools of jurisprudence (the Madh'hab)42 hold that sane adult male converts from Islam must 
be executed – even in cases that do not involve treason or rebellion.43  This approach reflects Islamic 
legal tradition dating back to Caliph Abu Bakr, who succeeded Mohammed as leader of the nascent 
Muslim community.  Pakistani writer on Islam and Islamic law, Muhammad Iqbal Siddiqi, offers an 
explanation for the tradition approach: 
 
 . . . the sayings and doings of the Holy Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him), the 
 decision and practice of the Caliph Abu Bakr (Allah be pleased with him), the consensus of the 
 opinion of the Companions of the Holy Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) and 
 all the later Muslim jurists, and even certain verses of the Holy Qur’an all prescribe capital 
 punishment for an apostate.44 
 
Siddiqi's remarks echo the views of many classical and contemporary Muslim jurists.  In his article 
'Apostasy and Human Rights', Ibn Warraq notes early Muslim jurists who cited verses of the Qur’an as 
                                                 
42  Four of these schools are Sunni (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali) and one is Shi’ite (Ja'fari). See Mohammed 
Hameedullah Khan, The Schools of Islamic Jurisprudence: A Comparative Study (1997). 
43  See Rahman Doi, Sharī 'ah: The Islamic Law'ah: The Islamic Law (2007) 265; Patrick Sookhdeo, ‘Islamic Teaching on the 
Consequences of Apostasy from Islam’ (2006), 1 Available at http://barnabasfund.org/UK/News/Archives/Islamic-Teaching-
on-the-Consequences-of-Apostasy-from-Islam.html?p=5&m=7%238&a=773&l=UK Accessed 9 July 2009; Yohanan 
Friedman, Tolerance and Coercion in Islam: Interfaith Relationships (2003); Michael Nazir-Ali, Islam, a Christian 
perspective (1984) 128.  But see: Mashood Baderin, International Human Rights Law and Islamic Law (2003) 123-124, 
128. 
44   Muhammad Iqbal Siddiqi, The Penal Law of Islam (1979) 97. 
authority for the rule that apostates must receive the death penalty.45 An example is al-Shafi (died 820 
C.E.), founder of one of the four orthodox schools of law of Sunni Islam.  According to Shafi, Qur’an 
2:217 meant that the death penalty should be prescribed for apostates.46  Qur’an 2:217 reads: '... But 
whoever of you recants and dies an unbeliever, his works shall come to nothing in this world and the 
next, and they are the companions of the fire for ever.'   Al-Razi adopted the same approach in his 
commentary on 2:217.47  Ibn Warraq also quotes commentaries by Baydawi (died c. 1315-1316) on 
Qur’an 4:89.  Baydawi  interprets this passage of the Qur’an to mean 'Whosoever turns back from his 
belief (irtada), openly or secretly, take him and kill him wheresoever ye find him, like any other 
infidel.'48  
 
As for modernists who follow the traditional approach to punishment of apostasy, they include the 
popular 20th century Pakistani Muslim scholar Abul A‘la Mawdudi, whose Qur’anic commentary is 
found in millions of Muslim homes.49     Mawdudi's views echo those of Majid Khadduri, who in the 
1950s, stated that ‘theologians agree that apostasy a violation of the law punishable in this world and 
the next. Not only is the person denies salvation in the next world but is liable to capital punishment by 
the state.’ 50 
 
However, close examination of the Qur’an and Hadith reveals that Islamic law on the punishment of 
apostasy is not as clear-cut as its exponents of the traditional approach suggests.  While the Qur’an 
condemns apostasy as a sin,51 it does not mandate an earthly penalty.52 Instead, verses of the Qur’an 
                                                 
45  Ibn Warraq, 'Apostasy, Human Rights, Religion and Belief', paper delivered at “Victims of Jihad” Conference held 
parallel to the UN’s 61st commission of Human Rights on 18th April 2005, Geneva, Switzerland (7 April 2004) (extensive 
citations omitted).  
46   Ibid. 
47   Ibid.  See S. Zwemer, The Law of Apostasy in Islam (1924) 34-35 (Note: Rahman highlights the inadequacy of 
Zwemer’s uncritically endorsement of the approach of Al-Razi, see Rahman, above n 38, 24.).  See also Fakhr al-din al-
Razi, al-Tafsir al-Kabir (Cairo ,1308 A.H.), Vol.2, lines 17-20.  
48   Zwemer, Ibid, 33-34. 
49  Sookhdeo, above n 43, 1.  See Abul A‘la Mawdudi, The Punishment of the Apostate According to Islamic Law 
(1963). English translation by Syed Silas Husain & Ernest Hahn (1994) 17. 
50  Majid Khadduri, War And Peace in the Law of Islam (1955) , 149-150. 
51   See Qur’an 4: 90; Qur’an 5: 59; Qur’an 16: 108.  
52   See Abdullah Saeed and Hassan Saeed, Freedom of Religion, Apostasy and Islam (2004), 79.  See also Mahmoud 
Ayoub, 'Religious Freedom and the Law of Apostosy in Islam' (1994) 20 Islamochristiana 75-91, 79. 
dealing with apostasy are silent on this point.53 Muslim jurists who advocate the death penalty for 
apostasy therefore rely upon ‘indirect verses of the Qur’an which they claim endorse their approach54 
and various Hadith (a collection of the purported words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad).55  
With respect to the Qur’an, Khadduri points to Qur’an 4:89, a verse dealing with hypocrisy.56  4:89 
states: 
 They wish that you disbelieve as they have disbelieved, then you become equal.  Do not 
 consider them friends, unless they mobilize along with you in the cause of God. If they turn 
 against you, you shall fight them, and you may kill them when you encounter them in war. You 
 shall not accept them as friends, or allies.  
 Other Muslim jurists, including former Chief Justice of Pakistan, Shaikh Abdur Rahman, have 
 rejected Khadduri's interpretation of 4:89.  Rahman considers the claim that execution is 
 justified under this verse as being impossible in the whole context of the hypocrisy verses.57 
 
Khuddari relies on a number of other verses of the Qur’an as justification for this position:  Qur’an 
2:214;58 Qur’an 4: 90-91;59  Qur’an  5:59;60 and Qur’an 16:108.61  Interestingly, none of these verses 
                                                 
53   See Qur’an 4: 90; Qur’an 5: 59; Qur’an 16: 108. 
54   See Saeed & Saeed , above n 52, 57.  
55  For in-depth examination of Hadith cited to justifying the execution of apostates, see Saeed & Saeed , above n 52, 
58-65; M.E. Asad Subhani, Apostasy in Islam (2004); Rahman, above n 38.  See also Dr. Ahmad Shafaat, ‘The Punishment 
of Apostasy in Islam (Part II): An Examination of the AHadith on the Subject’ (2006) 
http://www.islamicperspectives.com/Apostasy1.htm Accessed 3 July 2009.  
56   Khadduri, above n 50, 149-152. 
57   Rahman, above n 38, 41.  The hypocrisy verses are found at Qur’an 4:88-91.  They are recited below: 
 How to Deal With the Hypocrites  
 [4:88] Why should you divide yourselves into two groups regarding hypocrites (among you)? GOD is the 
one who condemned them because of their own behaviour. Do you want to guide those who are sent astray by 
GOD? Whomever GOD sends astray, you can never find a way to guide them.  
 [4:89] They wish that you disbelieve as they have disbelieved, then you become equal. Do not consider them 
friends, unless they mobilize along with you in the cause of GOD. If they turn against you, you shall fight them, 
and you may kill them when you encounter them in war. You shall not accept them as friends, or allies.  
 [4:90] Exempted are those who join people with whom you have signed a peace treaty, and those who come to you 
wishing not to fight you, nor fight their relatives. Had GOD willed, He could have permitted them to fight against 
you. Therefore, if they leave you alone, refrain from fighting you, and offer you peace, then GOD gives you no 
excuse to fight them.  
 [4:91] You will find others who wish to make peace with you, and also with their people. However, as soon as war 
erupts, they fight against you. Unless these people leave you alone, offer you peace, and stop fighting you, you may 
fight them when you encounter them. Against these, we give you a clear authorization.  
58   Qur’an 2.214: 
  'Or do you think that you would enter the garden while yet the state of those who have passed away 
before you has not come upon you; distress and affliction befell them and they were shaken violently, so that the 
Apostle and those who believed with him said: When will the help of Allah come? Now surely the help of Allah is 
states that the death penalty must be imposed by an earthly authority.   In interpreting these verses, 
Khadduri states:  ‘Although only the second of these four verses specifically states that [the] death 
penalty should be imposed on those who apostasize or turn back from their religion, all commentators 
agree that a believer who turns back from his religion (irtadda), openly or secretly, must be killed if he 
persists in disbelief.’62  However the same writer concedes that ‘the law of apostasy did not prevent a 
few believers, during Mohammed’s career, from reverting to polytheism.’ 63 
 
As for the Hadith, one verse in particular is raised by Muslim jurists who hold the view that the death 
penalty must be imposed for apostasy.  It states:  'Kill the one who changes his religion'.64  Khadduri, 
for example, offers up this Hadith as proof that apostates be put to death - without acknowledging its 
weak foundation.65 This Hadith was transmitted from Muhammad by only one person (I.e. it was not 
confirmed by others.)  It is therefore ahad, or solitary Hadith.  Kamali notes that the majority of 
scholars “are in agreement that the prescribed penalties (hudud) cannot be established by solitary 
Hadith (ahad), and that unbelief by itself does not call for the death penalty.”66  Such Hadith can be 
contrasted with Mutawatir, a category of Hadith that means 'continuously recurrent' or 'a report by an 
                                                                                                                                                                       
nigh!'  
59  Qur’an 4.90-91: 
    Except those who reach a people between whom and you there is an alliance, or who come to you, their 
hearts shrinking from fighting you or fighting their own people; and if Allah had pleased, He would have given 
them power over you, so that they should have certainly fought you; therefore if they withdraw from you and do 
not fight you and offer you peace, then Allah has not given you a way against them.  
 You will find others who desire that they should be safe from you and secure from their own people; as 
often as they are sent back to the mischief they get thrown into it headlong; therefore if they do not withdraw from 
you, and (do not) offer you peace and restrain their hands, then seize them and kill them wherever you find them; 
and against these We have given you a clear authority.  
60  Qur’an 5:59: 
  'Say: O followers of the Book! do you find fault with us (for aught) except that we believe in Allah and in 
what has been revealed to us and what was revealed before, and that most of you are transgressors?' 
61  Qur’an 16.108:   
 These are they on whose hearts and their hearing and their eyes Allah has set a seal, and these are the 
heedless ones.  
62  Khadduri, above n 50, 150. 
63  Khadduri, above n 50, 151. 
64  Sahih al-Bukhari, 9: 57.  (Hadith) 
65  Khadduri, above n 50, 150. 
66  Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Freedom of Expression in Islam (1997]) referring to Mahmud Shaltut, al-Islam 
Aqidah wa-Shari’ah (1966) 292-93.  See also Saeed & Saeed, above n 52, 64. 
indefinite number of people related in such a way to preclude the possibility of their agreement to 
perpetuate a lie.'67 
 
Another justification offered for this approach to apostasy is legal tradition that developed around the 
practice of the early Caliphs during and after the ridda wars.  Khuddari notes that the rule was strictly 
enforced after Mohammed’s death during the ridda wars and endorsed by the practice of the early 
caliphs who executed apostates.68  Moreover, this practice was sanctioned by Imjā (i.e. unanimity of 
opinion) and 'there is no disagreement as to its validity.’ 69  Yet, according to some Muslim jurists, the 
dire situation that the nascent Muslim community found itself in during the riddah wars delimits the 
boundaries of the rule on punishment of apostasy by execution.  The Hanafi school of Sunni 
jurisprudence, for example, only recognises that apostasy may be punished by death where the apostasy 
is couple with acts of war against Islam.70  
 
Even so, arguments raised by traditionalists in support of the death sentence in apostasy cases tend to 
downplay an obvious difficulty: the requirement that a rule sanctioning the death penalty be founded 
upon clear, reliable and unambiguous authority derived from the Qur’an and/or sahih Hadith.  Ayoub 
highlights this point in the following way:  
 
 Had the Qur’an considered apostasy a public offence deserving maximum punishment (hadd) 
 like theft, adultery or murder, these verses would have been the proper place for such a ruling. 
 In fact, traditions concerning the occasions of the revelation of the verses do not mention that 
 the persons who had turned away from the faith and later returned penitent were required to 
 make a public confession of their repentance. Nor was apostasy an issue of major concern for 
 classical commentators on these verses.71  
 
                                                 
67  Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (2003) 93. 
68   See Saeed & Saeed, above n 52, 65; Sookhdeo, above n 43, 7; Mohammed Adeb al-Jabri, Democracy, Human 
Rights and Law in Islamic Thought (2009),199- 200; and Mohamed Charfi, Islam and Liberty: The Historical 
Misunderstanding (2005) 51. 
69   Khadduri, above n 50, 151. 
70   See David A. Jordan, ‘The Dark Ages of Islam: Ijtihad, Apostasy, and Human Rights in Contemporary Islamic 
Jurisprudence’(2003) 9 Wash. & Lee Race & Ethnic Anc. L.J. 55, 62 (citations omitted). 
71   Ayoub, above n 52, 75-91. 
It is of interest that the Organisation of the Islamic Conference ('OIC'), which represents at least 57 
Muslim countries, while recognising that apostasy is a sin, has avoided the issue of punishment of 
apostates.72  
 
5.2 The Minority View 
 
A growing number of Muslims jurists and other commentators argue that Islamic law does not sanction 
the earthly punishment of apostasy.73 Kamali notes that a minority of medieval Islamic jurists held this 
view.  They include the Hanafi jurist Sarakhsi (d. 1090), Maliki jurist Ibn al-Walid al-Baji (d. 494 AH) 
and Hanbali jurist Ibn Taymiyyah (1263-1328).74  In recent years, a number of senior Islamic clerics 
have issued fatwas that reflect this view.  They include the Grand Mufti of Egypt Ali Gomaa75 (a Sunni 
Muslim) and Grand Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri76 (a Shi'ite Muslim).    
Baderin highlights the main thrust of the 'no earthly punishment approach'.  He notes that: ‘apostasy 
simpliciter, in the sense of an individual denouncing Islam without more, whenever mentioned in the 
Qur’an does not stipulate any worldly punishment, but is only describes apostasy as attracting 'severe 
punishment in the hereafter.’77  Thus, ‘it is not the changing of ones religion simpliciter that is 
                                                 
72   According to Article 10 of the OIC Declaration of the Rights of Man in Islam (1992), it is forbidden to change 
religion because Islam is the “natural” religion.   See also ANNEX I TO OIC RES.NO.16/22-C DECLARATION ON THE 
RIGHTS AND CARE OF THE CHILD IN ISLAM, Article 8.  Interestingly, the International Islamic Fiqh Academy, an 
organ of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), recently decided to review the issue of whether apostates should 
face the death penalty, see: Patrick Goodenough, 'Islamic Scholars Wrestle With Death-For-Apostasy Issue', 30 April 2009 
Available at /www.cnsnews.com/Public/content/article.aspx?RsrcID=47401.  Accessed 27 July 2009. 
 
73   The expanding body of authors favouring 'no earthly punishment of apostates' and the rethinking of the sharia rule 
on punishment of apostasy include: Rahman, above n 38, 133; Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islam and Human Rights: Tradition 
and Politics (1991), 169-170; Charfi, above n 68,  48-51; Farooq, above n 40; Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Islam and the 
Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Sharia (2008) 118-123; Abdulaziz Abdulhussein Sachedina, The Islamic roots of 
democratic pluralism (2001), 100; and Saeed & Saeed, above n 52.  See also: al-Jabri, above n 68, 224, and Leonard M 
Hammer, The International Human Right to Freedom of Conscience (2001), 135.  
74  See Mohammad Hashim Kamali, "Punishment in Islamic Law: A Critique of the Hudud Bill of Kelantan, 
Malaysia", (1998) 13(2) Arab Law Quarterly, 203-234 (citations omitted). 
75  Grand Mufti Ali Gomaa, Gomaa's Statement on Apostasy, The Washington Post, 25 July 2007.  
 http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/onfaith/  Accessed 6 July 2009;  Nashwa Abdel-Tawab, 'Whosoever will, let 
him disbelieve', Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 857, 9-15 August 2007. http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2007/857/eg9.htm  
Accessed 6 July 2009. 
76  Grand Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri, ‘Not Every Conversion is Apostasy’, by Mahdi Jami, In Persian, BBC 
Persian, February 2, 2005, retrieved April 25, 2006 http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/story/2005/02/050202_mj-montzari-
renegade.shtml Accessed 3 July 2009. 
77   As to differences among Muslim jurists on this issue, see Baderin, above n 43, 123-4.  For religious sources, see 
prohibited under Islamic law but its manifestation in a manner that threatens public safety, morals and 
freedom of others, or even the existence of the Islamic State itself.’78   
Saeed and Saeed summarise the central arguments against the 'earthly' punishment of apostasy: 
 
1. The Qur’an offers no justification for temporal ('earthly') punishment of apostasy;79 
2. Apostasy laws have been misused to eliminate opponents and sure up authoritarian regimes;80 
and 
3. These laws developed from isolated Hadith (ahad) and interpretations of these Hadith on the 
basis of analogy (qiyas) and ijtihād.81  As these sources and their interpretation do not guarantee 
certainty of knowledge (ilm qati) as understood in Islamic jurisprudence, Muslims in the 
modern period have the opportunity to re-think these laws.82 
 
Similar arguments have been presented by a range of other jurists. Many note that sahih Al-Bukhari 
(9:57) ['He who changes religion kill him!'] is of doubtful authenticity and providence, having been 
reported by one person only.83  Jordan notes that this verse is about treason rather than apostasy (i.e. to 
face the death penalty, the apostate in question must wage war on Islam rather than merely renounce 
                                                                                                                                                                       
notes 395-403. 
78   Baderin, above n 43, 125. 
79  Saeed & Saeed, above n 52.  Of the fourteen passages in the Qur’an that refer to apostasy, seven refer to 
punishment (mostly referring to punishment in the next life).   
80  Saeed & Saeed, above n 52, 40, 43, 100 & 103.  Charfi argues that the death penalty for apostasy is a political rule 
not a religious rule. This rule was used to justify the wars of apostasy waged in the aftermath of Mohammed's death, and has 
been deployed in the service of authoritarian politics subsequently.  Charfi, above n 68, 51.  See also Hamadi Redissi & Jan-
Erik Lane, 'Does Islam Provide a Theory of Violence?' in The Enigma of Islamist Violence (2007) 38.  For him, lack of 
freedom of religion in Muslim countries is the product of underdevelopment.   Charfi, above n 68, 48-9.  This reflects the 
view of UN  Rapporteur Mr. Abdelfattah Amor ('action to promote freedom of religion or belief is inextricably linked to 
action to promote democracy and development.')  E/CN.4/1999/58, para 123. 
81  Ibid, 167.  See also: Charfi, above n 68, 51. On ijtihā dd in classical Sunni jurisprudence see: Éric Chaumont, ‘Ijtihā d d 
et histoire en islam sunnite classique selon quelques juristes et quelques theologiens', in Robert Glkove (ed), Islamic Law: 
Theory and Practice (1997), 7-23.  An interesting development that may strengthen the minority position is the current 
review by the Turkish Ministry of Religious Affairs of Hadith of dubious authenticity (with a view to removing ideas and 
practices that have no sound basis in Islam).  See Brian Whitaker, ‘Islamic Newspeak’ The Guardian (Online) 26 February 
2008 at www.guardian.co.uk  Accessed 3 July 2009. 
82   Saeed & Saeed, above n 52, 168. 
83   Charfi, above n 68, 49; Redissi & Lane, above n 80, 27-46;  Samuel Hosain Lamarti, The Development of 
Apostasy and Punishment Law in Islam (PhD Thesis, Glasgow University, 2002) 1, xii.  
the faith).84 Forte notes that the verse reflects challenges faced by the nauseant Muslim community that 
was fighting for its very existence in the aftermath of Mohammed's death. Its unity was threatened at 
various times by defection, treachery, and insurrection by tribes that had returned to their pre-Islamic 
beliefs.85  This distinction between treason (which is a threat to the government) and individual acts of 
apostasy involving religious belief (which poses no such threat) is the reason why some Muslim States 
do not prosecute individuals for simply leaving Islam for another religion.86   
 
Various verses of the Qur’an may be invoked to argue against the earthly punishment of apostasy.  
Grand Mufti Sheikh Ali Gomaa (Egypt) listed a number of these verses in a recent article that appeared in The 
Washington Post.  According to Gomaa, punishment of apostates 'is left until the Day of Judgement, 
and it is not to be dealt with in the life of this world. It is an issue of conscience, and it is between the 
individual and Allah.'87 Gomaa states that 'the essential question before us is can a person who is 
Muslim choose a religion other than Islam? The answer is yes, they can because the Qur’an says, 'Unto 
you your religion, and unto me my religion,' [Qur’an, 109:6], and, 'Whosoever will, let him believe, 
and whosoever will, let him disbelieve,' [Qur’an, 18:29], and, 'There is no compulsion in religion. The 
right direction is distinct from error,' [Qur’an, 2:256].'88 
 
Other verses from the Qur’an that may be invoked to support this view, including this one: ‘exhort 
them; your task is only to exhort. You cannot compel them [to believe].’ (Qur’an 88:21-22) 
 
As for Hadith, Farooq points to a concreted example of 'how the Prophet handled a case of simple 
apostasy, not related to any treason or rebellion.'89  Significantly, the death penalty was not imposed on 
the apostate.90  
                                                 
84  See Jordan, above n 70, 61-21. 
85  David F. Forte, ‘Apostasy and Blasphemy in Pakistan’ (1994) 10 Conn J Int’L Law 27, 44. 
86  According to the Hanafi school of Sunni jurisprudence, only apostasy couples with acts of war against Islam 
merits death.  See Jordan, above n 70, 62 (citations omitted). 
87  Ali Gomaa, ‘The Meaning of Jihad in Islam’ 21 July 2007 Published in The Washington Post, Available at 
http://www.aligomaa.net/news_files/4.html  Accessed 27 June 2009. 
88  Ibid. 
89  Farooq, above n 40.  
90  Sahih al-Bukhari,  9: 318 states that: 'A bedouin gave the Pledge of allegiance to Allah's Apostle for Islam. Then 
the bedouin got fever at Medina, came to Allah's Apostle and said, "O Allah's Apostle! Cancel my Pledge," But Allah's 
 In concluding this discussion, it is clear that an increasing number of Muslim jurists do not agree with 
the approach of the schools of Islamic jurisprudence on the issue of punishment of apostasy.  There are 
compelling arguments, derived from the text of the Qur’an, that whilst apostasy is a sin, Islam 
guarantees religious freedom and does not compel Muslims to remain in the religion. Nor does it 
mandate earthly punishment of those who chose to depart from the faith. Growing support for this 
position reflects, inter alia, the influence of the human rights movement.  Attention now turns to 
whether the punishment of apostasy can be reconciled with international human rights law.91 
 
6. The Punishment of Apostasy and Human Rights Standards 
 
The relationship between Islamic law (as practiced in various States) and international human rights 
standards has been examined by various international actors (including the UN Commission on Human 
Rights) for decades.92  Apostasy is regarded as a crime under Islamic law and carries the death penalty 
in various Muslim-majority States.93  Judicial punishment of apostasy has drawn international criticism 
of the States involved.94  Unsurprisingly, a growing body of literature on human rights and the 
punishment of apostasy has emerged, which forms part of a wider body of scholarship on the 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Apostle refused. Then he came to him (again) and said, "O Allah's Apostle! Cancel my Pledge." But the Prophet refused 
Then he came to him (again) and said, "O Allah's Apostle! Cancel my Pledge." But the Prophet refused. The bedouin finally 
went out (of Medina) whereupon Allah's Apostle said, "Medina is like a pair of bellows (furnace): It expels its impurities 
and brightens and clears its good.”  
91  According to An-Na'im, '...there should be no penal or other negative legal consequences for apostasy and all the 
related concepts from an Islamic perspective, because belief in Islam presupposes and requires freedom of choice which can 
never be valid under coercion or intimidation.'  An-Na'im, above n 73, 122. See his survey of scholarly debates on 
punishment of apostasy in Islam , see 117-122. See also: Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, 'Islamic Foundations of Religious 
Human Rights' in John Witte, jnr and Johan D van der Vyver (eds), Religious Human Rights in Global Perspectives : 
Religious Perspectives (1996) 337-359.  See  generally: Mohammad Omar Farooq (weblog) 'On Apostasy and Islam: 100+ 
Notable Islamic Voices affirming the Freedom of Faith' 2 April 2007 
http://apostasyandislam.blogspot.com/  accessed 29 June 2009.  
92  See official website of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Religion or Belief 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/ENGLISH/ISSUES/RELIGION/index.htm> Accessed 28 May 2009. 
93 In all Muslim States where the approach of the established schools of Islamic jurisprudence is followed, apostasy is, in 
theory at least, punishable by death - unless legislation provides otherwise. There are some 46 States where Muslims 
form the majority of the population.  Of these, 15 have declared Islam the religion of the State and 5 are designated 
Islamic Republics.  See Mashood Baderin, 'A Macroscopic Analysis of the Practice of Muslim States Parties to 
International Human Rights Treaties: Conflict or Congruence?' (2001) 1 Human Rights Law Review 265, 265.   Apostasy 
is punishable by death in Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Qatar, Yemen, Iran,Sudan, Afghanistan, the Comoros Islands 
 and Mauritania.  In various other Muslim countries, apostasy is theoretically a capital crime but the death penalty in not 
actually imposed.  In some instances the death penalty has been commuted on appeal.  Lesser penalties are sometimes 
imposed. For relevant state practice see Clarke, above n 35. 
94   See Mohamed S. El-Awa, Punishment in Islamic Law: A Contemporary Study (2000) 49-50, 53. 
relationship between Islam and human rights.95   
 
As is evident from the preceding discussion, the right to freedom of religion and belief provides the 
foundation for a human rights-based analysis of punishment of apostasy. This right is recognised under 
a range of international instruments and resolutions, including United Nations General Assembly 
resolutions, international human rights law treaties, and general comments of the ICCPR Human Rights 
Committee. The key provisions on freedom of religion and belief include the following:  
1. 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (‘UDHR’) ‘[e]veryone has the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief’;96 
2. ICCPR: ‘[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This 
right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice’;97 
3. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance Based on Religion or Belief:98 
 ‘[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This shall 
include freedom to have a religion or whatever belief of his choice’; 
‘[n]o one shall by subject to discrimination by any state, institution, group of persons, or 
person on the grounds of religion or other belief’;99  
and  
‘[a]ll States shall take effective measures to prevent and eliminate discrimination on the 
grounds of religion or belief in the recognition, exercise and enjoyment of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in all fields of civil, economic, political, social and cultural life’100  
 
 
One of the purposes of the 1981 Declaration was to clarify the nature and scope of Article 18 of the 
ICCPR.  Like the UDHR, the 1981 Declaration is not legally binding upon States.  Nonetheless, one 
can infer a certain level of consensus regarding the right to conscience among state delegates who 
                                                 
95   See for example: Baderin, above n 43; al-Jabri, above n 68; Charfi, above n 68; Jordan, above n 70; Mayer, above 
n 73; Zawā tītī, above n 5. 
96  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), 2nd sess, 177th plen mtg, UN Doc A/810, art 18. 
97  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Res 2200A (XX1), UN GAOR, 21st sess, supp no 16, UN 
Doc A/6316 (1966), art 18(1). 
98  Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance Based on Religion or Belief, GA Res 36/55, UN GAOR, 
36th sess, supp no 51, UN Doc A/36/684 (1981), art 1(1), ('The 1981 Declaration') 
99  Ibid, art 2(1). 
100   Ibid, art 4(1). 
participated in drafting it.101   
 
While the right to freedom of religion is a fundamental and well established human right, Baderin notes 
that, as expressed in Article 18(3) of the ICCPR, this right is not absolute.102  In the case of the freedom 
to manifest ones religion or beliefs, these rights may only be subject to such limitations as are 
prescribed by law and necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of others.  Such limitations, however, do not include a right to take measures to 
punish those who exercise the right to freedom of religion by changing or abandoning their religion. In 
its second periodic ICCPR report, Sudan stated that conversion from Islam is not an offence in Sudan 
per se, but only the manifestation of such conversion in a manner that adversely affects public safety.  
Put differently, Sudan has purported to define apostasy in such a manner that places it within the realms 
of the exception in Article 18(3) of the ICCPR.103 
 
General Comment 22 issued by the Human Rights Committee reinforces the notion that the punishment 
of apostasy is a violation of the ICCPR.  Para. 3 states: "Article 18 does not permit any limitations 
whatsoever on the freedom of thought and conscience or the freedom to have or adopt a religion or 
belief of one's choice.”  Para. 5 states : "The Committee observes that the freedom to 'have or to adopt' 
a religion or belief necessarily entails the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to 
replace one's current religion or belief with another or to adopt atheistic views, as well as the right to 
retain one's religion or belief."  
 
6.1 Punishment of Apostasy as a violation of International Human Rights Law 
The approach adopted by the schools of Islamic jurisprudence with respect to the punishment of 
apostasy is at odds with the human rights standards noted above.  They raise two important legal 
questions.  Can the crime of apostasy (and punishment of the same) be reconciled with international 
human rights law?  Are States that are party to the ICCPR that retain the crime of apostasy and\or fail 
                                                 
101   Hammer, above n 73, 60-61. 
102   Baderin, above n 43, 124. 
103   Section 126 of the Sudan Criminal Act 1991, recognises the crime of apostasy which is punishable by death.  
Sudan has explained this law by stating that those who commit apostasy are a danger to the fabric of society and are akin to 
traitors.  See UN Doc\A\46\40 (1991), p127.  See Baderin, above n 93; Paul M. Taylor, Freedom of Religion: UN and 
European Human Rights Law and Practice (2005) 51. 
to protect persons from punishment for leaving Islam acting in accordance with their obligations under 
international law?   
 
According to most legal commentators who address these questions from a human rights law 
perspective, the answer to both questions is in the negative.  Those who take the opposite position 
generally interpret human rights standards in accordance with a traditional view of Islamic law.  Their 
approach invariably assigns priority to their view on Islamic law.  
 
UN human rights bodies have adopted the view that the punishment of persons who depart from Islam 
cannot be reconciled with fundamental human rights standards.104  The Human Rights Committee’s 
General Comments on the ICCPR states that all human beings, regardless of who they are and where 
they live, have the right to: 
 
 … choose a religion or belief, including the right to replace one's current religion or belief with 
 another or to adopt atheistic views ... Article 18.2 bars coercion that would impair the right to 
 have or adopt a religion or belief, including the use of threat of physical force or penal sanctions 
 to compel believers or non-believers to adhere to their religious beliefs and congregations, to 
 recant their religion or belief or to convert.105 
 
The Human Rights Committee has also made clear that the ICCPR: 
 
 does not permit any limitations whatsoever on the freedom of thought and conscience or 
 on the freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of one's choice.  These freedoms are 
 protected unconditionally, as is the right of everyone to hold opinions without interference 
 from the State.106 
 
Moreover the Human Rights Committee confirmed that ‘in accordance with Articles 18 .2 and 17, no 
                                                 
104  For a list of commentators that have highlighted the fundamental character of the right to change religion under 
Article 18 of the ICCPR, see Hammer, above n 73, 135. 
105   Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 22, para. 5.  See also: E/CN.4/2005/61, para 47.  
106   Human Rights Committee, General Comment 22, para . 3. 
one can be compelled to reveal his thoughts or adherence to a religion or belief.’107  For these reasons, 
States Parties to the ICCPR (who include almost all Muslim States) have a responsibility to protect 
persons who choose to change their religion.  Laws which permit the punishment of those who leave 
Islam or any other religion or ideology for that matter, are in clear violation of the ICCPR.  This is 
evident from the following comment by the Committee: 
 
the freedom to ‘have or to adopt’ a religion or belief necessarily entails the freedom to choose a 
religion or belief, including the right to replace one's current religion or belief with another or 
to adopt atheistic views, as well as the right to retain one's religion or belief.108 (Italics added) 
 
A further layer of protection under international law to those who change or abandon their religion 
arises from the status of the right to freedoms of religion and belief as a peremptory norm of 
international law.109  In General Comment 24, the Human Rights Committee stated that 'The 
fundamental character of these freedoms is also reflected in the fact that this provision cannot be 
derogated from, even in time of public emergency, as stated in article 4.2 of the ICCPR.'110  It also 
notes that: 
 
 Reservations that offend peremptory norms would not be compatible with the object and 
 purpose of the ICCPR. Although treaties that are mere exchanges of obligations between 
 States allow them to reserve inter se application of rules of general international law, it is 
 otherwise in human rights treaties, which are for the benefit of persons within their jurisdiction. 
 Accordingly, provisions in the ICCPR that represent customary international law (and a fortiori 
 when they have the character of peremptory norms) may not be the subject of reservations. 
 Accordingly, a State may not reserve the right to … deny freedom of thought, conscience and 
 religion ….111  
                                                 
107  Ibid. 
108  Ibid, para 5.  See also: E/CN.4/2006/5/Add.3, paras. 73 (country visit to Sri Lanka); and Warraq, above n 45.. 
109   See Human Right Committee, General Comment No. 22, para 5.   
110  Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 24: ('Issues relating to reservations made upon ratification or 
accession to the ICCPR or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in relation to declarations under article 41 of the ICCPR') , para 
1. 
111  Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 24, para 8. 
 Thus, a State may not reserve the right to deny freedom of thought, conscience and religion.  This 
approach reflects the prevailing view among legal scholars, namely that in the case of peremptory 
norms of international, there can be no derogation by States.112  In any case, as a number of 
commentators have observed, no Muslim State has ever entered a reservation to the ICCPR with regard 
to imposition of the death penalty for apostasy.113    Such States are therefore bound, under treaty law at 
least, to guarantee the right to freedom of religion to their citizens.  However, not all Muslim-majority 
States are parties to the ICCPR.  Prominent non-parties include Saudi Arabia and Malaysia.  
The extent to which non-parties are bound, under customary international law, by norms contained in 
the ICCPR is the subject of doctrinal debate.  The existence of a customary norm is dependent upon 
both state practice and opinio juris pointing towards the existence of the norm.114  According to 
Goldsmith and Posner, while there is said to be a large body of customary international human rights 
law, it does not reflect a general and consistent body of State practice.115  Instead, customary 
international law on human rights is based more on human rights consensus found in General Assembly 
resolutions, multilateral treaties and the writings of scholars and less on State practice.  As this body of 
'law' has very little influence on State behaviour, this raises doubts as to whether it is indeed binding 
under custom.116  Nonetheless, there are a number of human rights that have been recognised as 
peremptory norms of international law.  Significantly, the Human Rights Committee has recognised 
freedom of religion as a  norm that is not capable of derogation.  Moreover, General Comment 24 
suggests that this right forms part of customary international law.117  If so, Saudi Arabia cannot ignore 
                                                 
112  Ibid.  See also: B. G. Ramcharan, The Right to Life in International Law (1985) 133. 
113  Rosalyn Higgens, Problems & Processes: International and How We Use It (1994) 98. On reservations to human 
rights treaties by Muslim countries see Nisrine Abiad, Sharia, Muslim States and International human rights treaty 
obligations: A comparative study (2008) 67-82. For withdrawal of Islamic reservations, see 90-92.  Mayer notes that the 
right to change religion was added to the UDHR with direct reference to Islam and apostasy.  The right was added at the 
behest of a Lebanon’s delegate who objected to the ban on conversions from Islam.  (In 1948, Lebanon was a pluralistic 
society comprised for the most part of Christians, Muslims and Druze.)  A number of Muslim countries opposed this move, 
although Pakistan's representative spoke forcefully in defence of the provision as being in full accord with Islam.  All 
Muslim countries eventually voted for the UDHR, except Saudi Arabia. See Mayer, above n 73, 164. 
114  See North Sea Continental Shelf, (1969) ICJ Reports, para. 74 and 77.   
115  Jack L Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (2005) 132. 
116  Ibid, 132.  For State practice with respect to punishment of apostasy see, Clarke,  above n 35. 
 
117  UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 24 (52), UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/ Rev. 1/Add. 6, 1994, para 8. 
See also Vojin Dimitrijevic, 'Customary Law as an instrument for the protection of Human Rights' (Working Paper, 2006) 
12.  Available at <www.ispionline.it/it/documents/wp_7_2006.pdf>at 14 October 2009. 
it and must recognise and protect the customary law right of its citizens to exercise freedom of religion 
and belief. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
 
7. The Importance of Reform in the Context of Violence by Radical Islamists  
 
One practical step that Muslim States could take to undermine the ideology of al-Qaeda and its ilk (and 
at the same time bring their law and practice into closer conformity with the ICCPR) is to amend their 
domestic law so that the punishment of apostasy is prohibited.  In those States where the views of 
schools of Islamic law prevail, the legal changes advocated here would require a re-interpretation of 
Sharia with respect to punishment of apostasy.  A transition in such States towards a legal system that 
recognises and fully protects international human rights (such as the right to change religion) would be 
expedited if supported by these schools.  Robust application of the doctrine of ijtihād (reinterpretation 
of Islamic law) may be needed for this new approach to apostasy to be adopted by the Islamic schools 
of jurisprudence and embraced by the umma.  In applying this doctrine, Islamic law schools could take 
account of obligations under international human rights law and perhaps wider factors which shape the 
modern world (e.g. globalization, pluralism and democracy).  At a political level, reform of law and 
practice with regard to apostasy may require an ideological shift in some States.  However, given the 
history of abuse of apostasy laws, those Muslim States seeking to build stronger and more stable 
democracies may benefit from the abolition of these laws.118  Such reform would also undermine a 
central plank of al-Qaeda’s ideology: the notion that the killing of apostates is justified under Islamic 
law.  Muslim States could go further and abolish all crimes against religion (Islam) that operate in a 
discriminatory manner.119  The introduction and enforcement of non-discriminatory laws that protect all 
members of society from religious hatred and violence could be accompanied by public awareness 
campaigns to promote the necessary cultural changes.120 
 
                                                 
118   Ayoub has noted that 'Muslims have themselves politicized apostasy by using it as an ideological weapon against 
one another.'  See Ayoub, above n 52, 75-91. 
119   Ideally, all crimes would be defined in a non-discriminatory manner in accordance with fundamental principles of 
international human rights law.  Under this approach, one measure of a good law is that it does not discriminate against 
minorities (whether religious or otherwise) but instead treats all persons as equal before the law.  The right to change 
religion or belief is underpinned by the principle of non-discrimination.  This principle protects members of all religions 
(and none) from adverse treatment on the basis of their religion or beliefs.  Thus, under international human rights law, 
departing from a religion is not a punishable act.  It is instead a fundamental human right. 
120  The UN General Assembly have often emphasised the importance of education, economic development, friendly 
cooperation between States and peaceful resolution of the Middle East conflict as ways to bring an end to politico-religious 
violence and extremism in the Arab world.  See for example: ‘Measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of 
terrorism’, Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy above n 6. 
8. Conclusion 
 
Australia, India and indeed all States whose citizens have been directly exposed to the danger of 
violence by radical Islamists should consider all possible causes of the same.  One such cause is the 
abuse of norms of Islamic law by radical Islamists to justify their actions.  In an era of globalisation, all 
States, whether Muslim-majority or otherwise, have an interest in addressing this problem. Given the 
sensitivity of the issue of apostasy for many Muslims, it is perhaps unsurprising that apostasy laws and 
their interpretation has received little attention by Muslim States and organisations in their response to 
violence by radical Islamists.  However, this does not mean that the issue should be ignored.  Non-
Muslim States, such as Australia and India, have an interest in encouraging various Muslim-majority 
States (eg Pakistan and Indonesia) and organisations (including the Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference) to tackle the issue.  If these States and organisations are willing and able to refute 
interpretations of Islamic law that permit violence against civilians,  they will make a significant 
contribution to the struggle to isolate violent extremists and their radical ideologies. 
 
It is important to acknowledge that the invocation of religious norms to justify attacks against civilians 
is only one aspect of the problem of violence by extremists who profess to be Muslims.  Analysis of 
other causes of violence by radicalised Islamists is beyond the scope of this article.  However it must be 
acknowledged that strong arguments have been advanced pointing to political rather than religious 
considerations as the primary cause of violence by these actors.121  Perhaps the two causes cannot be 
separated, particularly in the context of the recent sectarian violence in Iraq.  Nevertheless, it is clear 
that extremists are citing religious norms in their bid to justify acts of violence against civilians (and 
recruit others to engage in such conduct).  This phenomena cannot be ignored if the causes and 
potential cures of violent extremism are to examined in a comprehensive fashion. 
 
The ideology and actions of violent extremists is having a destabilising effect upon - and undermining 
                                                 
121  According to Robert Pape (Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism [2005]), nationalism rather than 
religion is 'the taproot of suicide terrorism' (79).  His theory suggests that religion is a subsidiary cause of such violence.  
Defence of the homeland (84-87) and the desire to end alien occupation (83-84) are considered more significant causes. 
Pape states that 'the presence of American military forces for combat operations on the homeland territory of the suicide 
terrorists is stronger than Islamic fundamentalism in predicting whether individuals from that country will become al-
Qaeda suicide terrorists.' (103).  Moreover, Al-Qaeda propaganda emphasizes the 'Crusader' theme, which relates to 
occupation (117-24).  See also: Bruce Michael Bongar, Lisa M. Brown, Larry E. Beutler, Philip G. Zimbardo, 
Psychology of terrorism (2007) 106. (Religious fanaticism is neither a necessary nor sufficient factor in suicide 
terrorism). But see: Mohammed M. Hafez, Suicide bombers in Iraq: the strategy and ideology of martyrdom (2007) 214-
215; Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (2006) 325.  (Many religious fanatics who have engaged in terrorism in Iraq 
sought to justify their conduct by reference to religious norms, including apostasy).  
security within - various Muslim States and societies.  Measures that would undermine the ideology of 
al-Qaeda and other such organisations should therefore be given serious consideration.  Yet the 
proposals advanced in this article would be difficult to implimented: the notion of law reform to 
prohibit the punishment of apostasy would be likely to encounter strong opposition in conservative 
Muslim States.  Moreover, such reform would not guarantee an end to violence by non-State actors 
against those they regard as apostates.  Nonetheless, it could play an important role - as part of a 
broader counter-terrorism strategy - in addressing the causes of violence against civilians by those who 
claim that their conduct is justified under Islamic law.122   
 
It is hoped that this conference paper will help promote further discussion of this issue.  It could be 
addressed at bilateral and multilateral diplomatic meetings where counter-terrorism law and policy is 
addressed.   Such international forum include the UN General Assembly (which devised the UN 
counter-terrorism plan) and the OIC (a representative body for Muslim States and societies) could 
address the issue. Ideally, the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy should be revised to comprehensively 
tackle the problem of abuse of religious norms of violent extremists.   The OIC could support this 
process by calling up all Muslim States to reform their law and policy as suggested above. 
 
 
 
                                                 
122  The current international strategy to address terrorism (including terrorism by groups that seek to justify their 
actions by reference to Islam) is set out in the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, above n 6.   
